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Incorporation of a company for testing residency—if applied uniformly—is likely the best 
and most accurate way to reflect corporate residency for tax purposes. However, it does not always 
reflect economic reality. There is not a consensus on what the best approach is. The Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (“OECD”) countries overwhelmingly use three tests 
for residency: incorporation,1 central management and control,2 and domicile.3 Indeed, a court in 
the United States or other jurisdictions may often ask if tax-avoidance motives exist when 
incorporation occurs in one jurisdiction and central management and control occurs in another.4 
This Article follows the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act on many international tax provisions 
that caused a shift in thinking at both the U.S. level, and at the international level in terms of 
deciding what formulations would be the best way to ensure proper taxation while promoting 
horizontal and vertical equity. 
The genesis of this Article is a response and critique of an article on the same subject by 
the same author: Charles Edward Andrew Lincoln IV, Is Incorporation Really Better Than Central 
Management and Control for Testing Corporate Residency? An Answer to Corporate Tax Evasion 
and Inversion, 43 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 359 (2017). The author now critiques the point of that article 
and comes to a different conclusion based on different criteria: specifically, new case law, 
Musgrave’s economic theory of accretion of wealth, and the importance of substance-over-form 
doctrines. 
 
II. THE CONCEPT OF RESIDENCY INTERTWINED WITH INCORPORATION AND DIFFERENT TYPES OF 
RESIDENCY 
 
A. What, then, is Incorporation? 
 
Incorporation is a legal principle as much as it is a social, philosophical, and 
anthropological principle. It represents the confluence of English common law emanating from 
Anglo-Saxon England to Enlightenment Europe of unified entities having a corporeal body. From 
a modern legal perspective, incorporation is the formation of a legal entity that is separate from a 
 
1 See Eric J. Smith, The U.S.-Mexico Tax Treaty, 8 FLA. J. INT'L L. 97, 105 (1993). 
2 Luca Cerioni, The “Place of Effective Management” as a Connecting Factor for Companies’ Tax Residence 
Within the EU vs. the Freedom of Establishment: The Need for a Rethinking?, 13 GERMAN L.J. 1095, 1095–96 
(2012). 
3 See Topsnik v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue Serv., No. 15-1251, 2017 WL 9939283 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 14, 2017). 
4 There are many cases dealing with substance-over-form issues. See Starr Int'l Co. v. United States, 275 F. 
Supp. 3d 228, 238 (D.D.C. 2017) (“The letter explained that, under the circumstances, the Competent Authority 
could not ‘conclude that obtaining treaty benefits was not at least one of the principal purposes for moving Starr's 
management, and therefore its residency, to Switzerland.’ . . . In support of that conclusion, the letter highlighted the 
following four considerations: [Starr]’s original incorporation in Panama and its management and control in 
Bermuda suggest the original corporate structure may have been developed with tax avoidance purposes in mind 
and/or with a purpose of avoiding the provision of information on [Starr]'s activities to the Internal Revenue 
Service.”).  






Justice Marshall—one of the most prolific Chief Justices of the United States Supreme 
Court—somewhat famously provided that “[a] corporation is an artificial being, invisible, 
intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law. Being the mere creature of law, it possesses 
only those properties which the charter of its creation confers upon it, either expressly, or as 
incidental to its very existence. These are such as are supposed best calculated to effect the object 
for which it was created.”6 The Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law of Corporation defines the 
corporation “as an entity (usually a business) having authority under law to act as a single person 
distinct from the shareholders who own it and having rights to issue stock and exist indefinitely,” 
but also defines it as “a group or succession of persons established in accordance with legal rules 
into a legal or juristic person that has legal personality distinct from the natural persons who make 
it up, exists indefinitely apart from them, and has the legal powers that its constitution gives it.”7 
Interestingly, at least by Classical antiquity and certainly by the time of the Roman 
Republic, “[t]here is authority for the statement that the concept of collective entity antedates that 
of the individual; that ‘groups of men united by the reality of fiction of blood relationship’ into 
families, clans or tribes were recognized units of primitive society even before the individual was 
so regarded.”8 Regardless of the specific history and purposes, “[i]t is well settled . . . that a 
 
5 Incorporation, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
6 Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 636 (1819). 
7 Corporation, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).  
8 1 Fletcher Cyclopedia Corp. § 1 n.1 (2019) (quoting MAINE, ANCIENT LAW (4th ed.)). See also In re 
Steinberg's Estate, 274 N.Y.S. 914, 919 (Sur. Ct. 1934). “For a history of the earliest English trading companies, 
beginning in 1359 with the Merchant Adventurers of England (The Hamburg Company later), the Eastland 
Company (1579), the Levant Company (1581), see 3 Encyc. Laws of England, tit. Companies, Chartered 239. The 
East Indian Company, chartered December 31, 1600, introduced (1612) the joint stock feature into trading 
companies. See history of its growth and charters in 3 Encyc. Laws of England, tit. Companies, Chartered 243.” 1 
Fletcher Cyclopedia Corp. § 1 n.3 (2019).  
 
Anthropologically speaking, it is unclear whether individual identity must precede group identity historically or 
whether the opposite is true. Arguably empirical evidence exists on both sides of the question. The full quote from 
Henry Maine’s account of Ancient Law seems to indicate some ambivalence by the time of the Roman Republic 
whether the individual preceded the group, but seems more convinced that the group defined the individual first: 
“In order to solve this apparent paradox, and to bring into greater clearness the train of ideas which I have been 
endeavouring to indicate, I must borrow the results of the inquiry which was attempted in the earlier portion of the 
preceding chapter. We saw one peculiarity invariably distinguishing the infancy of society. Men are regarded and 
treated, not as individuals, but always as members of a particular group. Everybody is first a citizen, and then, as a 
citizen, he is a member of his order—of an aristocracy or a democracy, of an order of patricians or plebeians; or, in 
those societies which an unhappy fate has afflicted with a special perversion in their course of development, of a 
caste. Next, he is a member of a gens, house, or clan; and lastly, he is a member of his family. This last was the 
narrowest and most personal relation in which he stood; nor, paradoxical as it may seem, was he ever regarded as 
himself, as a distinct individual. His individuality was swallowed up in his family. I repeat the definition of a 
primitive society given before. It has for its units, not individuals, but groups of men united by the reality or the 
fiction of blood-relationship.”  MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 107–08 (4th ed.). 
However, Immanuel Kant laid out an argument in his discussion of antimonies and transcendental thought in 
the Critique of Pure Reason that there can be no ascertaining one way or another of one side being correct or not in 
such investigations. He states in resolution to his argument that “there is no possibility of ever ascertaining which 
side is in the right.” Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason Section VII 513 (Werner S. Pluhar trans., Hackett 





corporation is a distinct legal entity that can act only through its agents.”9 
 
B. Different Types of Tests for Residency 
 
Incorporation has been defined variously. However, specifically in relation to the tax treaty 
between the United States and Mexico, “[a]side from one exception . . . the Treaty only applies to 
persons who are residents of either the United States or Mexico.”10 Indeed, it must be noted that 
“[i]n accordance with the U.N. and OECD Models, Article 4 (Residence) provides that ‘resident’ 
means any ‘person’ who is subject to tax in either Mexico or the United States, under the laws of 
that country, because of his domicile, residence, place of management, place of incorporation, or 
any other criterion of a similar nature.”11 Although there is a consensus between the United Nations 
and the OECD, and although the United States, “unlike any other developed country, asserts 
worldwide income taxing jurisdiction on the basis of citizenship, the Treaty follows the OECD 
Model, not the U.S. Model, by not including in the definition of ‘resident’ U.S. taxpayers who 
have no connection to the United States other than citizenship.”12 The matter remains that the “term 
‘resident’ does not include any person who is subject to tax in a contracting country with respect 
only to income from sources in that country.”13 Indeed, “for example, an individual resident of the 
United States will be covered by the Treaty since she is subject to U.S. tax because of her residence. 
By contrast, the Treaty will not cover a U.S. citizen who resides outside of Mexico or the United 
States.”14  
Per what central management and control is, it should be noted that “the ‘central 
management and control’ test formed the basis of the ‘place of effective management’ test which, 
under the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Model for bilateral 
conventions against double taxation, is currently adopted as a tiebreaker rule.”15 A tiebreaker rule 
is “a criteria for allocating the tax residence of companies in cases where both contracting States 
consider a company as resident under their own domestic law, and which is also used, as one 
amongst alternative connecting factors for corporate tax residence.”16 In turn, the allocation of 
corporate tax residence to a country allows the State at issue to tax the company on its worldwide 
income, thereby representing a factor of utmost importance for the attribution of taxing rights.”17 
Alternatively, the concept of domicile is key in taxation. Indeed, for a practical example, 
the United States Tax Court noted that “with respect to individuals, both the original U.S.-Germany 
Treaty and the post-2006 treaty limit the definition of a ‘resident of a Contracting State’ to 
 
Publishing, Co., 1996). 
 
9 Larsen Chelsey Realty Co. v. Larsen, 656 A.2d 1009, 1024 (Conn. 1995); see also Yale Univ. v. Out of the 
Box, LLC, 990 A.2d 869, 876 (Conn. App. Ct. 2010). 
10 Smith, supra note 1, at 105. 
11 Id.  
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. (emphasis omitted).  
15 Cerioni, supra note 2, at 1095. 
16 Id. at 1095–96. 
17 Id. at 1096. 





individuals ‘liable to tax therein by reason of [domicile or residence]’, and both exclude from the 
definition ‘any person who is liable to tax in that State in respect only of income from sources in 
that State or capital situated therein.’”18 The Tax Court went on to state that “the treaty test for 
residence in a contracting State is the individual’s liability to pay tax to the State as a resident, 
which, in the case of Germany, means that the individual must be taxable on his or her worldwide 
income.”19 The Court went on further to state “that [this] is the test for residency under the U.S.-
Germany Treaty[,] confirmed by the commentary with respect to article 4 of the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Model Double Tax Convention on Income and 
Capital (1977) (OECD Model Treaty), article 4, paragraph 1 of which is, in all pertinent respects, 
identical to article 4, paragraph 1, of the original and post–2006 U.S.-Germany treaties.” 20 
If dual residency exists, often this dual residency can be resolved through a tiebreaker 
position in a tax treaty.21 Such dual-resident examples can occur in many jurisdictions.22 Indeed, 
it should also be noted that non-resident corporations can have their business profits taxed through 
permanent establishments.23 However, dual residency is a basic form of tax arbitrage, because “the 
international tax rules of Subpart F (adopted assuming an open system) and the domestic tax rules 
of residency and entity classification (adopted assuming a closed system), when used together, can 
result in international tax arbitrage.”24  
 
18 Topsnik v. Comm'r, 143 T.C. 240, 259 (T.C. 2014), aff'd sub nom, Topsnik v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue 
Serv., No. 15-1251, 2017 WL 9939283 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 14, 2017). 
19 Id. (citations omitted).  
20 Id. at 259–60. “THE COMMENTARY TO Article 4 paragraph 1 states, in pertinent part: ‘As far as 
individuals are concerned, the definition aims at covering the various forms of personal attachment to a State which, 
in the domestic taxation laws, form the basis of a comprehensive taxation (full liability to tax).’ OECD Committee 
on Fiscal Affairs, Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital, at C(4–9) (1997).” Id. at 260.  
21 “If this situation arises, you must consider whether one rule supersedes the other (that is, whether the 
company can be said to be resident in only one of the jurisdictions). The answer to this question depends on whether 
a double tax treaty applies and, if so, whether the treaty provides for the company to be resident in only one 
jurisdiction.” PRACTICAL LAW TAX, COMPANIES: UK RESIDENCE AND PERMANENT ESTABLISHMENTS, Practice Note 
4-204-0101, Westlaw (database updated June 2019). 
22 “Because the United States defines corporate tax residence according to place of incorporation, while Ireland 
uses the location of central management and control, a company incorporated in Ireland with central management 
and control in the United States is a tax resident of neither country.” Tyler H. Lippert, OECD Base Erosion & Profit 
Shifting: Action Item 6, 37 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 539, 546 (2017). 
23 See PRACTICAL TAX LAW, supra note 21 (“A non-resident company is generally subject to corporation tax on 
its profits only to the extent that those profits are attributable to the company's UK permanent establishment (section 
5(3) and 19, Corporation Tax Act 2009). (However, there are exceptions to this general rule – see Basis of taxation: 
the implications of UK residence and permanent establishments for further detail.)”).  
24 Adam H. Rosenzweig, Harnessing the Costs of International Tax Arbitrage, 26 VA. TAX REV. 555, 582 
(2007); see also Mitchell A. Kane, Strategy and Cooperation in National Responses to International Tax Arbitrage, 
53 EMORY L.J. 89, 99 (2004) (“A definition of arbitrage tied to degrees of difference across laws will not be able to 
filter rate differentials. It is not clear, for example, what it would mean to say that a difference in rates is less of a 
difference than the difference between, say, rules for determining corporate residency, the latter of which drives the 
classic international tax arbitrage transaction involving dual resident companies.”); cf. Id. at 169 n.23 (“There is one 
exception. From a revenue standpoint, the economic effect of a variance in rules making up the tax base could 
always be recast in terms of uniform bases with differing tax rates. Once all differences are viewed as rate 
differentials it would be possible to ordinalize them. I reject such an approach, though, because it would never be 
able to filter rate differentials from the class of arbitrage transactions.”); Stephen Utz, Ability to Pay, 23 WHITTIER L. 







III. WHY INCORPORATION IS A BETTER SOLUTION 
 
This Article’s main concern is whether a uniformly adopted system of determining 
residency would be better solved through uniform adoption of central management and control or 
through incorporation.25 This is not necessarily calling for a reordering of already existing rules 
into new rules, but a suggestion of picking one for uniformity.26 Indeed, it is a perplexing and 
interesting enigma why the economic operations of a corporation do not mimic the legal structure 
of multinationals. 
The author of this current Article has formerly argued that “[c]entral management and 
control is the best test for determining corporate residency because it is the test most likely to 
 
REV. 867, 901 (2002) (“Bavaria adopted separate income and capital taxes in 1848, combining them into a single 
general income tax in 1850. Hesse and the independent republic-city of Bremen also introduced income taxes in 
1848. Of these, only the Bremen tax worked well enough to survive for a reasonable period without revision. 
Inadequate audit machinery is usually blamed for the failure of the Bavarian and Hessian income taxes. Several 
Prussian governments tinkered with the class and consumption taxes, with a view to making them resemble an 
income tax more closely. But these experiments fought shy of adopting a workable administrative structure. More 
theorists joined the income tax movement, however.”).  
25 There are many examples of the attempt to establish uniform laws. See, e.g., Edward L. Rubin, The Practice 
and Discourse of Legal Scholarship, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1835, 1888 n.140 (1988) (citations omitted) (“One example 
is the standard legal scholarship dealing with payments law, a branch of commercial law. In the 1940s, the American 
Law Institute, under the direction of Karl Llewellyn, began a comprehensive codification of commercial law, 
including a revision of the uniform law regarding negotiable instruments. No commentary on this project appeared 
until the late 1940s, when a few student notes and a few articles by the drafters were published. Extensive critical 
commentary did not begin until the statute had been promulgated. Similarly, there was very little discussion of 
electronic funds transfers by academics until legislative efforts were initiated in 1974. Once that occurred, there was 
a virtual explosion of academic interest, but most of this came too late to affect the legislative effort.”).   
26 See generally Marco Jimenez, Distributive Justice and Contract Law: A Hohfeldian Analysis, 43 FLA. ST. U. 
L. REV. 1265, 1301 n.133 (2016) (“The idea is similar to that first espoused by the Greek philosopher Empedocles, 
who maintained that everything that exists is but a recombination of that which has come before; nothing is created 
ex nihilo, for out of nothing comes nothing. See, e.g., FREDERICK COPLESTON, A HISTORY OF 
PHILOSOPHY 62 (1946) (arguing that, according to Empedocles, ‘objects come into being through the mingling of 
the elements, and they cease to be through the separation of the elements: but the elements themselves neither come 
into being nor pass away, but remain ever unchanged’)”). Cf. J. Christopher Rideout, Penumbral Thinking Revisited: 
Metaphor in Legal Argumentation, 7 J. ASS'N LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS 155, 159 (2010) (“Like many of the 
terms used in classical Greek rhetoric, the word ‘metaphor’ is itself a metaphor, taken from the Greek verb 
‘metapherein,’ meaning ‘to transfer.’ The transference involves giving one thing a name that belongs to something 
else. Empedocles, a 5th century B.C. philosopher and orator who taught the noted rhetorician Gorgias, may have 
been the first to become known for his conscious, deliberate use of metaphor. Aristotle took note of this usage, 
additional commenting that Empedocles was the first to discover rhetoric. Argumentative use of metaphors goes 
back a long way.”); Allen v. Scholastic Inc., 739 F. Supp. 2d 642, 663 n.154 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“To name some 
examples: according to Greek mythology, Hercules had to accomplish twelve feats in order to expiate the sin of 
killing his children and to be granted immortality; in Puccini's opera, Turandot, the main character has to solve three 
riddles to win the hand of a princess or forego his life; and in Mozart's Magic Flute, the lead figure is required to 
pass several tests in order to enter the Temple of Wisdom and win the hand of his beloved, although he manages to 
win her despite failing the tests.”).  





accurately reflect economic reality of a corporate entity.”27 The author has since become convinced 
that incorporation is the better solution for determining corporate residency for tax purposes, for 
two reasons: (1) incorporation—if adopted uniformly—would reflect economic reality more 
accurately; and (2) incorporation—if adopted uniformly—would allow substance and form to be 
more uniform, thereby providing for less reliance on substance-over-form arguments, because 
ultimately form and substance should be united. Indeed, there does not seem to be a clear answer 
for any of the proposed solutions even though the problem has existed for several decades: “[i]n 
coping with this and related problems, courts have enunciated a variety of doctrines, such as step-
transaction, business-purpose, and substance-over-form. Although the various doctrines overlap 
and it is not always clear in a particular case which one is most appropriate, their common premise 
is that the substantive realities of a transaction determine its tax consequences.”28 
Courts have long recognized that “[t]he fundamental premise underlying the Internal 
Revenue Code is that taxation is based upon a transaction's substance rather than its form. Thus 
sham transactions are not recognized for tax purposes, and losses allegedly generated by such 
transactions are not deductible.”29 Moreover, there are multiple types of substance-over-form-
doctrine interpretations that courts employ in order to resolve questions of sham transactions, 
“which include, in relevant part, (1) the conduit theory; (2) the step transaction doctrine, and (3) 
the economic substance doctrine”30 Furthermore, this can become an estimably complex scenario 
when and where multiple steps are involved in transactions because “the separate steps of a 
complex transaction should be treated as having independent significance or as related steps in a 
unified transaction.”31  
Courts have often tried to resolve what solution is the best with differing results over time. 
Many cases agree that “Gregory v. Helvering finds expression in the rule calling for a realistic 
approach to tax situations. As so broad and unchallenged a principle furnishes only a general 
direction, it is of little value in the solution of tax problems.”32 However, analogously, “[t]he 
substance[-]over[-]form analysis . . . is a distinct and limited exception to the general rule under 
Moline Properties that separate entities must be respected as such for tax purposes.”33 Thus, there 
does not seem to be a solid solution to the substance-over-form doctrine. And, by extension, if an 
agreed-upon substance-over-form doctrine does not exist, then likewise, an agreed-upon test for 
corporate residency would not exist. 
If every country uniformly used the incorporation test for residency, then corporations 
would no longer face tax incentives to incorporate in a country other than that in which their 
 
27 Charles Edward Andrew Lincoln IV, Is Incorporation Really Better Than Central Management and Control 
for Testing Corporate Residency? An Answer to Corporate Tax Evasion and Inversion, 43 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 359, 
359 (2017). 
28 King Enters., Inc. v. United States, 418 F.2d 511, 516 n.6 (Ct. Cl. 1969). 
29 Freytag v. Comm'r, 904 F.2d 1011, 1015 (5th Cir. 1990), aff'd, 501 U.S. 868 (1991). 
30 Enbridge Energy Co. v. United States, 553 F. Supp. 2d 716, 726 (S.D. Tex. 2008), aff'd, 354 F. App'x 15 (5th 
Cir. 2009). 
31 Aeroquip-Vickers, Inc. v. Comm'r, 347 F.3d 173, 182 (6th Cir. 2003). 
32 Higgins v. Smith, 308 U.S. 473, 476 (1940); see also Humana Inc. v. Comm’r, 881 F.2d 247, 254 (6th Cir. 
1989). 
33 Humana Inc., 881 F.2d at 254. 





economic activities are concentrated.34 Thus, the uniform adoption of the incorporation test for 
residency would have two beneficial effects. First, incorporation would then more closely reflect 
economic reality, due to the removal of tax incentives that presently cause incorporation decisions 
to differ from economic reality or substance. This would eliminate the need to test for residency 
using the complex and ambiguous central-management-and-control test (which presumes that 
incorporation often occurs elsewhere than the country where a corporation’s economic activities 
are centered, and determines residency on the basis of the latter). Second, the uniform adoption of 
the incorporation test for residency—by removing incentives to base incorporation decisions on 
taxes rather than on economic substance—would eliminate the present complexity of 
distinguishing between the form and substance of incorporation transactions. Their form and 
substance would be united, with respect to residency. Transparency, in other words, would be 
achieved. 35 
Per the second prong, if incorporation is adopted uniformly, it would allow substance and 
form to be more uniform, thereby providing for less reliance on substance-over-form arguments, 
because ultimately form and substance should be unified. Courts frequently make similar 
inquiries.36 Such considerations are often made in whether deductions taken were appropriate in 
tax cases.37 However, this idea of using incorporation falls in line squarely with the economic 
concept of accretion of wealth as indicated by the Haig-Simons definition of income and through 
Musgravian38 economic analysis; even the Tax Court stated, “[g]enuine income represents 
economic gain, whether calculated under the Haig-Simons definition, . . . or as expansively 
adumbrated by the Supreme Court in Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 429-
431 (1955).” 39 The Court went on to state that “it is the lack of economic reality in the partnerships' 
 
34 Gator.com Corp. v. L.L. Bean, Inc., 341 F.3d 1072, 1077 (9th Cir. 2003) (“See Perkins v. Benguet Consol. 
Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 72 S.Ct. 413, 96 L.Ed. 485 (1952) (finding general jurisdiction when president of 
Phillipines-based corporation maintained office, kept company files, held director meetings, distributed salaries, and 
conducted other company business in the forum state)”).   
35 Cf. Fischer Bros. Aviation, Inc. v. Comm’r, 30 T.C.M. (CCH) 1351, 1354 (T.C. 1971) (“The sole disputed 
question herein is whether certain notes issued at the time of incorporation of petitioners reflect bona fide 
indebtedness, thereby entitling petitioners to interest deductions under section 163. The decided cases look to the 
economic reality of the underlying transaction and often adopt a variety of tests and criteria in resolving this issue.”).  
36 As the United States Tax Court stated, “We must first determine whether the incorporation of Dispersalloy 
was an event with independent economic substance. Respondent does not contend that the incorporation of 
Dispersalloy was a sham; rather, respondent argues that the incorporation lacked economic substance independent 
from the later exchange of stock. Respondent urges us to find that the incorporation of Dispersalloy was simply one 
link in a chain of steps to transfer the assets of petitioners' sole proprietorship to J&J for stock.” Weikel v. Comm’r, 
51 T.C.M. (CCH) 432, 439 (T.C. 1986). 
37 The Tax Court dealt with this in Singal v. Commissioner, stating, “[t]his Court considered the applicability of 
section 165(c)(2) in Seed v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 880 (1969). In Seed, the taxpayer, an attorney, was allowed to 
deduct expenses incurred during an unsuccessful attempt to secure a charter to operate a savings and loan 
association. This Court found that the taxpayer's activities in the venture qualified as a ‘transaction entered into for 
profit.’ These activities included: (1) hiring a law firm and a certified public accountant; (2) hiring a firm to conduct 
an economic survey of the area; (3) naming the board of directors; (4) authorizing and issuing shares of stock; (5) 
preparing articles of incorporation; and (6) appearing as a witness at public hearings.” Singal v. Comm’r, 44 T.C.M. 
(CCH) 1521, 1523–24 (T.C. 1982). 
38 Author has not found reference to this word in its adjective form but thinks such a form should exist. 
39 Bealor v. Comm’r, 72 T.C.M. (CCH) 730, 772 (T.C. 1996). 





reported income that explains and justifies respondent's willingness to concede that such income 
should be reduced to zero in the years affected.”40 
 
IV. MUSGRAVE’S ECONOMIC ANALYSIS IN RELATION TO CAPITAL EXPORT AND CAPITAL IMPORT 
NEUTRALITY 
 
Capital export neutrality and capital import neutrality are two of the fundamental theories 
of structuring an international tax system.41 The theory of capital export neutrality would be most 
easily achieved if “all countries taxed only the worldwide income of their own residents and 
refrained from taxing income earned within their borders by nonresidents.”42 Capital import 
neutrality, on the other hand, would be most easily achieved if “all countries taxed all income 
earned within their borders, did not subject nonresidents to discriminatory rates, and gave up their 
right to tax foreign source income earned by their own residents.”43 
However, it must be clarified what Peggy Musgrave thought was economic accretion of 
wealth. It should be noted that “normative content can only be derived from economic or 
philosophical (justice) theories.”44 This is ultimately to say “that four primary norms support 
accretion taxation: reducing disparities in wealth (a fairness norm), taxing intangible benefits from 
holding wealth (a fairness norm), conforming to the Haig-Simons ideal income tax base (a fairness 
and efficiency norm), and structuring a ‘neutral’ tax system that does not favor one type of 
investment over another (an efficiency norm).”45 
 
40 Id.  
41 “The general policy framework is a reaffirmation of the principles of residence basis taxation, the economic 
theory of capital export neutrality, and the link of those principles to the principles of vertical and horizontal tax 
equity.” Stanley I. Langbein, The Future of Capital Export Neutrality: A Comment on Robert Peroni's Path to 
Progressive Reform of the U.S. International Tax Rules, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1019 (1997). 
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Indeed, much of the “economics literature since has been greatly influenced by 
[Musgrave’s] work. Musgrave examined only outbound investment from both a theoretical and 
empirical perspective and concluded that following a policy of capital export neutrality would 
maximize worldwide welfare.”46 Indeed, “[s]he also concluded that a policy of allowing only a 
deduction for foreign income taxes, which she labeled ‘national neutrality,’ would maximize the 
national welfare of the capital-exporting nation.”47 In essence, it must be noted that: 
 
Musgrave's analysis was quite straightforward. From a worldwide perspective, 
she asked what international income tax policies of capital-exporting nations 
would maximize the sum of domestic and foreign returns on investments and 
domestic and foreign taxes—the sum of pretax returns—without regard to where 
in the world returns occur or taxes are collected.”48  
 
This led her to the conclusion that “[f]rom the perspective of worldwide economic 
efficiency, the best policy is one that has as few efficiency costs as possible. A tax provision is 
regarded as inefficient whenever the worldwide allocation of investment capital—its location—is 
different than it would be in the absence of taxes.”49  Avoiding locational distortions of investment 
therefore is regarded as the most efficient policy.”50 
Musgrave’s theory is not always all-inclusively fulfilling because “Musgrave’s analysis 
suffers from the general difficulty of using a world without taxes as a baseline since a market 
economy simply cannot function in the absence of government institutions, which must be 
financed through taxation.”51 Ultimately, “in this instance, investors seeking the highest after-tax 
rates of return will locate investments where the pretax rates of returns are highest if all investment 
income is taxed identically. Of course, variations in tax rates on investment income among 
countries are commonplace.”52 And this is a fair concern, but it must be taken in comparison with 
the idea that “the foundation of Musgrave's theory is an assumption that the home of the taxpayer 
who owns the income-producing capital has at least a residual interest in all of its taxpayer's 
income.”53 
However, it seems fair that the concepts of tax equity and the best capital export neutrality 
and capital import neutrality can be aligned with the concepts of incorporation.54 This argument in 
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connection with Musgrave is only as strong as the connection that Musgrave noted “that horizontal 
equity depends on ‘an objective index of equality or inequality’ for its incorporation into a 
particular tax system.”55 
Thus, the reason incorporation is likely a better solution than central management and 
control is because it will help improve capital export neutrality and capital import neutrality.56 
Moreover, Musgrave’s theory of economic increase in wealth in relation to taxation supports this 
concept that incorporation is a better solution. 
 
V. FURTHER THOUGHTS: DISTINCTION BETWEEN A LEGAL FORMALISTIC AND LEGAL REALISTIC 
PERSPECTIVE ON CORPORATE TAX RESIDENCY 
 
As a corollary to the purely legal and economic perspective dénouement, the distinction 
between central management and control and incorporation highlights a fundamental theoretical 
distinction in domestic tax law and international tax law. The central-management-and-control test 
prescribes a greater value on a legal realistic perspective on corporate tax residency. The 
incorporation test places a value on the legal formalistic perspective on corporate tax residency. 
Ultimately, this is a distinction between placing more value on the jurisprudential values of legal 
formalism and legal realism. 
It has been stated that there are “two foundational theories of judicial decision making: 
legal formalism and legal realism. Every other description of judicial adjudication is an offshoot 
of one—or, on occasion, both—of these theories. Originalism and purposivism, eclecticism and 
interpretivism, even pragmatism and critical legal studies: all trace their lineage back to legal 
formalism or legal realism.”57 
However, in law schools in the United States, “[g]iven the centrality of these two theories 
to academic discourse, it is only natural that legal formalism and legal realism are also at the core 
of public debate on judicial decision making.”58 Furthermore, “[w]hat is alarming, however, is the 
stark contrast between the way these theories are presented in popular culture and the way they are 
discussed in the private, or academic, domain.”59 In contrast, “[i]n public, legal formalism and 
legal realism are depicted in extreme, simplified terms that barely resemble the nuanced treatment 
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they receive in legal scholarship. The differences, in fact, are so vast that they are more easily 
thought of as distinct theories necessitating distinct labels.”60  
There exists “some degree of formalism in every legal system. Rules are established and 
generally followed. American legal realism, in rejecting legal formalism, relegated legal rules to a 
relatively minor place in its descriptive analysis of law and legal systems. Realists ultimately 
expanded the legal landscape beyond the activities of courts to include all that happens in a legal 
system.”61 Historically, “Realists started by essentially deconstructing judicial decisions—
demonstrating that decisions were often based on internal contradictions and false precedents. The 
presence of ‘rules’—in the form of statutes or precedents—does not result in predictability; rather, 
legal decisions were inherently uncertain and unpredictable.”62 
Compared to the United Kingdom, “American judicial reasoning is commonly believed to 
have internalized the lessons of Legal Realism, whereas English judicial thinking is taken to 
represent the vestiges of Legal Formalism.”63 This is a vital distinction given that both systems 
essentially originated together in England, because, while “judges in both legal systems arrive at 
more or less similar solutions to the problems that they identify, their ‘styles of decisionmaking 
are strikingly different.’ American (i.e., Delaware) judges appear to tackle the policy and economic 
issues at stake directly as part of their reasoning, whereas English judges do so from within the 
language of case law and the traditional sources of legal reasoning.”64 Although it is unclear 
“whether the difference actually affects outcomes in cases . . . one of the effects of Legal Realism 
on reasoning in this domain may have been its relaxation of the stylistic (or formal) constraints of 
legal doctrine, which has enabled lawyers and judges to focus more directly on the normative 
considerations at stake.”65 
Overall, the distinction between the two vital theories of corporate residency—central 
management and control and incorporation—ultimately highlights a fundamental distinction in 
domestic tax law and international tax law. They fit squarely into the conceptions of legal 
formalism and legal realism.  
However, although incorporation would prescribe a more formalistic approach, this Article 
has attempted to argue that the economic reality inherent in a unified and uniform approach to 
incorporation could lead to an equally appealing decision from a legal realism prism of interpreting 
international tax law. This is because legal formalism focuses on normative theories of law—a 
system of incorporation would be based on purely theoretical, already established systems of legal 
principles. As a consequence, incorporation is based on purely legal and previously decided 
principles of law. Alternatively, legal realism is often cited to be the opposite of legal formalism 
in some sense.66 However, in this case, if jurisdictions adopted uniform approaches, legal 
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principles would be the naturalistic approach to law. In this sense, legal realism and legal 




In conclusion, this Article argued that incorporation—if adopted uniformly—would (1) 
reflect economic reality more accurately; and (2) enable uniform substance and form, thereby 
decreasing reliance on substance-over-form arguments, because ultimately form and substance 
should be united. Moreover, the conception of unified incorporation as a test for corporate 
residency in an international context does not solely lie in the sense of legal formalism, but also, 
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